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MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WHEN INCOME
MATTERS*
Paolo Bertoletti and Federico Etro
We analyse monopolistic competition when consumers have an indirect utility that is additively
separable. This leads to markups depending on income (both in the short and long run) but not on
the market size, which generates pricing to market, incomplete pass-through and pure gains from
variety for countries that open up to trade. Firms’ heterogeneity a laMelitz implies a Darwinian effect
of consumers’ spending on business creation and a Linderian effect on (endogenous) quality
provision. We discuss extensions with an outside good and heterogenous agents, and offer simple
and tractable specifications (linear or log-linear) of the demand functions.
This article proposes an alternative model of monopolistic competition in the tradition
of the studies of large markets (Chamberlin, 1933), where firms choose prices
independently and entry is free. The model is based on a class of non-homothetic
preferences, unexplored in the analysis of monopolistic competition, which satisfy
indirect additivity and delivers convenient specifications for applied research,
especially in trade and macroeconomics.
As is well known, themodel introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (D–S, 1977: Section I) and
based on constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences over differentiated goods
has become a workhorse model in modern economics. It implies constant markups and
an endogenous number of firms that is proportional to both the number of consumers
and their per capita income.Moreover, under firmheterogeneity, CESpreferences imply
that changes in population or income do not affect the efficiency of the active firms.
These features have key consequences, for instanceon the structure of and thegains from
trade (Krugman, 1980;Melitz, 2003) and on firms’ behaviour over the business cycle (see
Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987 and, more recently, Bilbiie et al., 2012).
From an empirical point of view, however, the CES model has some drawbacks.
Primarily, it cannot account for the variability of markups across countries and/or over
the business cycle. There is indeed a consistent evidence in the trade literature that, over
the long run, prices andmarkups tend to be higher in richer countries (Alessandria and
Kaboski, 2011; Fieler, 2011); there is also some macroeconomic evidence that markups
are variable over the business cycle (for instance, Nekarda andRamey (2013)make a case
for procyclical markup behaviour in reaction to demand shocks).1 Moreover, although
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the empirical analysis of the impact of market size on prices under monopolistic
competition has rarely distinguished between income and population effects,
Simonovska (2015) studies international pricing of traded goods (online sales of clothes
shipped to foreign markets and in competition with many imperfect substitutes) and
finds a positive elasticity of prices with respect to per capita income but no significant
impact of population on prices.
To account for the variability of markups under monopolistic competition, one
has to depart from CES preferences. But models based on quasilinear (Spence,
1976; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Anderson et al., 2012) or general homothetic
preferences (Benassy, 1996) face similar limitations, since they remove any direct
effect of income on demand (with quasilinearity) or on demand elasticity (with
homotheticity). To obtain variable markups, D–S (1977: Section II) proposed non-
homothetic preferences represented by additively separable direct utility functions
(Krugman, 1979). As recently stressed, such ‘direct additivity’ generates equilibrium
prices that can either decrease or increase in the number of consumers
(Zhelobodko et al., 2012), implying an ambiguous impact of market size on welfare
and ambiguous selection effects under firm heterogeneity (Bertoletti and Epifani,
2014; Dhingra and Morrow, 2015). However, in spite of non-homotheticity, free
entry neutralises the impact of income on markups and market structure: in the
long-run equilibrium, when the number of firms adjusts to obtain zero expected
profits, prices and firm selection cannot be affected by changes in consumers’
expenditure (Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Bertoletti and Etro, 2014a, b). Notice that on
the one hand monopolistic competition models a la D–S (1977) were developed to
explain the number of varieties/competitors in the long run, on the other hand the
empirical relation mentioned between markups and income emerging in the trade
literature (Alexandria and Kaboski, 2011; Fieler, 2011; Simonovska, 2015) refers to a
time span that explicitly requires a long-run theoretical foundation. We propose an
alternative class of non-homothetic preferences and argue that it can easily account
for the stylised facts outlined above and, in particular, for the relation between
prices and income in the long run.2
Nevertheless, it is important to remark that, for a given number of firms,
income affects markups also under direct additivity of preferences (Behrens and
Murata, 2012a). Moreover, there exist other models based on non-homothetic
preferences in which income heterogeneity between individuals or across countries
‘matter’ in the sense of affecting crucially the market results even in the long run.
For instance, Simonovska (2015) studies a multi-country trade model where wages
are endogenous and exert an impact on the equilibrium markups, while Behrens
and Murata (2012b) show that differences in labour productivity affect the relative
gains from trade. In another important work based on non-homothetic prefer-
ences, Murata (2009) exploits increasing returns due to specialisation arising out
of differentiated intermediate goods. This implies that higher labour efficiency
2 On the crucial role of non-homotheticity in trade models see also the recent works by Fajgelbaum et al.
(2011), Markusen (2013) and Mrazova and Neary (2014).
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affects prices (and the number and composition of varieties) even in the long run
because it allows for more specialisation and lower marginal costs.3 Our
complementary approach in this article is to present a simple model in the D–S
tradition where income affects markups in the long run even in autarky, without
heterogeneous firms/varieties or consumers and without returns from specialisa-
tion.
Our main assumption is that consumers’ preferences can be represented by an
additively separable indirect utility function. Such ‘indirect additivity’ amounts to
assume that the relative demand of two goods does not depend on the price of other
goods, while it depends in general on income. It is thus different from ‘direct
additivity’, for which the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods does not
depend on the consumption of other goods. In fact, duality theory (Hicks, 1969;
Samuelson, 1969) tells us that direct and indirect additivity characterise two different
classes of well-behaved preferences (remarkably, the homothetic case of CES
preferences is the only common ground). A key implication of our assumption is
that the number of goods provided in the market does not affect their substitutability
and thus the demand elasticity, while income can affect both with crucial conse-
quences. Remarkably, simple and common direct demand functions, such as linear
demands and log-linear demands, emerge from our preferences (with ‘addilog’ and
exponential subutilities) and generate simple closed form solutions for variable
markups, which can be easily used in a variety of applied situations.
Monopolistic competition under indirect additivity produces two-sided results that
can be useful for trade and macroeconomic applications. First, it generalises the
neutrality of market size on the production structure which emerges in CES models,
thereby yielding pure gains from varieties as in Krugman (1980). Second, it delivers
markups that are variable in income/spending, generating pricing to market as a
natural phenomenon: as long as demand is less elastic for richer consumers, markups
are higher in markets with higher individual income. Moreover, markups do change
when demand shocks affect individual spending or supply shocks affect marginal costs.
We show that these results are robust to extensions in which an outside good represents
the rest of the economy, there is consumer heterogeneity in both preferences and
income, and also when firms differ in productivity a la Melitz (2003). At the very least,
our results suggest that empirical works should carefully distinguish the effects due to
per capita income from those associated to the population size.
The comparative statics for business creation is also of interest. Richer consumers
with less elastic demand induce firms to increase their markups, which triggers a more
than proportional entry of firms, while an increase in income inequality between
consumers tends to exert the opposite effects. Instead, when firms are heterogeneous
in productivity, indirect additivity establishes a Darwinian mechanism that is absent in
the Melitz model: less productive firms enter in booms (when income increases) and
exit during downturns (a sort of ‘cleansing effect’ of recessions). Finally, if firms can
invest in the quality of their products, we find that more productive firms tend to react
3 The article by Murata (2009) is akin to our own in stressing the different role played by population and
per capita income in affecting the elasticity of demand. It is different because it assumes directly additive
preferences and asymmetric final products sold in competitive markets.
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to an increase in consumers’ income by offering products of higher quality sold at
higher prices, which is consistent with the celebrated Linderian effect (Linder, 1961).
The work is organised as follows. In Section 1 we present our baseline model
characterising the endogenous entry equilibrium and introducing convenient specifi-
cations to be used in applied research. We also compare our results with those of
alternative models based on directly additive, homothetic and non-separable prefer-
ences. In Section 2 we extend the model in various directions and compare optimal and
equilibrium market structures. In Section 3 we study a two-country model a la Krugman
considering both costless trade between different countries and costly trade between
identical countries. We conclude in Section 4. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
1. A Model of Monopolistic Competition
Consider a market populated by L identical agents with income E > 0 to be spent on a
mass of n differentiated goods.4 We represent preferences through indirect utilities,
which depend on the prices pj of each variety j and on income or, exploiting
homogeneity of degree zero of the indirect utility, on their ratios sj  pj=E . Our key
assumption is the adoption of the following symmetric and additively separable
indirect utilities:
V ¼
Z n
0
v
pj
E
 
dj : (1)
As we will clarify below, this assumption identifies a general class of well-behaved
preferences that do not satisfy the D–S (1977) assumption of direct additivity, with the
remarkable exception of the CES case. To satisfy sufficient conditions for (1) being a
valid indirect utility function (while allowing for a possibly finite choke-off price and
obtaining well-behaved demand functions), we assume that the indirect sub-utility v(s)
is at least thrice differentiable, with v(s) > 0, v0ðsÞ\ 0 and v00ðsÞ [ 0 for any s\s,
v(s) = 0 for s  s, and lims!s vðsÞ; v0ðsÞ ¼ 0 for some s [ 0. These assumptions imply
that demand and extra utility are zero for a good that is not consumed.
The Roy identity provides the following direct individual demand function for good i:
xiðpi ;E ; lÞ ¼
v0
pi
E
 
l
; (2)
where
l ¼
Z n
0
v0
pj
E
 
pj
E
dj (3)
depends on the marginal utility of income: namely, l = E(@V/@E) < 0. The demand
function of each variety depends on its price and on the same price aggregator, l,
which is unaffected by the price pj of a single firm. Total market demand is
qi ¼ xiðpi ;E ; lÞL.
4 Using the wage as numeraire, E can be interpreted as the labour endowment of each agent (in efficiency
units).
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Preferences represented by (1) are homothetic if and only if v(s) is isoelastic, i.e., if
vðsÞ ¼ s1h with h > 1. Indeed, in such a case they are of the CES type, with indirect
utility V ¼ EðRj p1hj djÞ1=ðh1Þ, where h is the elasticity of substitution. By an important
result in duality theory (Hicks, 1969; Samuelson, 1969) the class of preferences which
satisfy ‘direct additivity’, i.e., that can be represented by an additive direct utility
U ¼ R n0 uðxjÞdj , for some well-behaved subutility u(), does not satisfy (1), with the
only exception of CES preferences.5 Therefore, the indirect utility (1) encompasses an
unexplored class of non-homothetic preferences whose corresponding direct utility
functions are non-additive.
Suppose that each variety is sold by a firm producing with constant marginal cost c > 0
and fixed cost F > 0 (both in labour units): the profits of firm i can then be written as:
pðpi ;E ;lÞ ¼
ðpi  cÞv 0 pi
E
 
L
l
 F : (4)
The most relevant implication of (2) is that the elasticity of the direct demand
corresponds to the (absolute value of the) elasticity of v0ðÞ, which we define as:
hðsÞ   v
00ðsÞs
v0ðsÞ [ 0:
This elasticity depends on the price as a fraction of income, pi=E , but is independent
from l and L.6 Instead, in the case of direct additivity the elasticity of the inverse
demand is uniquely determined by the consumption level.7
Any firm i maximises (4) with respect to pi . The first order condition (FOC) is
v0ðsiÞ þ ðpi  cÞv00ðsiÞ=E ¼ 0, which requires that (locally) h(s) > 1. Moreover the
second order condition (SOC) requires 2h(s) > f(s), where fðsÞ  v000ðsÞs=v00ðsÞ is a
measure of demand curvature. Notice that h0ðsÞs=hðsÞ ¼ hðsÞ þ 1  fðsÞ, therefore
h0 [ 0 if and only if h > f  1, in which case demand becomes more elastic when price
goes up or income goes down.8 The FOC for profit-maximising price can be rewritten
as follows:9
pe  c
pe
¼ 1
h
pe
E
  : (5)
This pricing rule shows that under indirect additivity the profit maximising price is
always independent from the mass of varieties supplied, because the latter does not
5 In addition, it can be shown that the assumptions of either direct or indirect additivity and homotheticity
imply that preferences are CES: see Blackorby et al. (1978, section 4.5.3).
6 Notice that h is a measure of the curvature of v(): as such, it could be related to well-known risk aversion
measures (Bertoletti, 2006; Behrens and Murata, 2007).
7 Under direct additivity, the (individual) inverse demand of variety i is given by piðxi ; kÞ ¼ u0ðxiÞ=k, where
k ¼ R n0 uðxj Þxjdj=E is the marginal utility of income. Notice that each inverse demand depends on its own
quantity and on the same quantity aggregator, k. Accordingly, both direct and indirect additivity satisfy the so-
called ‘generalized additive separability’: see Pollak (1972).
8 If demand is (locally) concave (v000 [ 0) the SOC is always satisfied and h0 [ 0. On the contrary, if
demand is convex (v000\ 0) we may have h0\ 0.
9 To guarantee the existence of a solution to (5) we assume sE [ c (the consumer willingness to pay is
large enough) and lims!s hðsÞ [ sE=ðsE  cÞ. Notice that the SOC guarantees uniqueness.
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affect the elasticity of demand. This property appears entirely consistent with the
Chamberlinian treatment of the ‘large group equilibrium’ (Chamberlin, 1933, ch. V).
It follows that an exogenous increase in the number of competitors would just
proportionally reduce the level of individual consumption.10 At the same time, the
optimal price grows with income if firms face a less elastic demand (and vice versa),
which provides a demand-side rationale for markups that are variable across markets
(or over the business cycle). Consider the realistic case of h0 [ 0: then, the model is
consistent with typical forms of pricing-to-market, i.e., the same good should be sold at
a higher price in richer (or booming) markets.11 Similarly, under the same assumption
a change in the marginal cost is transmitted (pass-through) to prices in a less than
proportional way (undershifting). Summing up, we have:
PROPOSITION 1. Under indirect additivity and monopolistic competition the profit-
maximising prices are independent from the mass of active firms; they increase in the income of
consumers and less than proportionally in the marginal cost, if and only if demand elasticity is
increasing in the price.
Since by symmetry the equilibrium profit is the same for all firms and it is decreasing
in their mass, we can characterise the endogenous market structure through the zero
profit condition (p  c)EL/np = F. This and the pricing rule (5) jointly deliver the
free-entry equilibrium mass of firms and production size of each firm:
ne ¼ EL
F h
pe
E
  ; qe ¼ F h
pe
E
 
 1
c
: (6)
The following Proposition summarises the comparative statics for ne :
PROPOSITION 2. Under indirect additivity, in a monopolistic competition equilibrium with
endogenous entry the mass of firms increases proportionally with the number of consumers; it
increases more than proportionally with the income of consumers and decreases with the marginal
cost if and only if the demand elasticity is increasing in the price.
As a corollary, the equilibrium size of each firm qe in (6) does not depend on the
number of consumers and it decreases with individual income if and only if h0 [ 0. To
understand these results and their applications, it is convenient to think of changes inL as
changes in the scale of the economy, of changes in E as (due to) demand shocks on the
disposable income of consumers and of changes in c as supply shocks to firms’
productivity. First of all, the impact of an increase in the scale of the economy is always the
same as under CES preferences: a larger market size does not affect prices and
production per firm but simply attracts more firms without inducing any other effect on
10 In the D–S case of direct additivity, an exogenous increase in the number of varieties n could either
increase or decrease the price level, cutting more or less than proportionally the level of individual
consumption.
11 However, it is immediate to verify that pe=E is always decreasing in income under our assumptions.
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the market structure. This neutrality result and its key implications for the Krugman
(1980)model of trade extend fromCESpreferences to the entire class described by (1).12
Second, an increase of the spendable income of consumers has more complex
implications. Consider the realistic case where higher income makes demand more
rigid (h0 [ 0). Then, a positive demand shock reduces the perceived demand elasticity
and induces firms to increase their markups and reduce sales accordingly. For a given
number of firms this leads to a large positive impact on gross profits which promotes
business creation and increases more than proportionally the number of varieties
provided in the market.
Third, consider an increase in firms’ productivity associated with a reduction of the
marginal cost (still assuming h0 [ 0): lower costs are translated less than proportion-
ally to prices, which increases the markups and triggers additional entry (while the
impact on firms size is ambiguous).13 Accordingly, and contrary to what happens with
CES preferences, our more general model allows demand and supply shocks to
generate additional processes of business creation/destruction. This would alter the
dynamic path of macroeconomic models with endogenous entry (for instance Bilbiie
et al., 2012).
Under monopolistic competition and exogenous productivity, indirectly additive
preferences exclude any impact of the number of goods on markups, which instead
emerges under general additive or quadratic utilities (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008;
Zhelobodko et al., 2012). However, it is important to stress that such an impact is not
really due to changes in the ‘intensity’ of competition between firms (where there are
no strategic interactions) but to changes in the elasticity of substitution between goods
perceived by consumers. Only concentrated markets with a small number of firms
competing a la Bertrand or a la Cournot produce a direct impact of the number of
firm on markups and our model can be easily extended in this direction to generate
competitive effects (see Bertoletti and Etro (2014b) for a discussion of these effects
under imperfect competition).14 Alternatively, a link between market size and prices
could be also introduced through endogenous productivity due to the adoption of
specialised input, as in Murata (2009).
1.1. Examples
The results of our model can be illustrated with simple specifications that deliver
closed-form solutions. Tractable cases arise if v01ðÞ is homogenous or logarithmic up
to a linear transformation (see Behrens and Murata (2007) for a discussion under
12 As an immediate consequence, increasing the population just induces pure gains from variety. This is a
remarkable difference compared to the D–S model, where the existence of gains from trade can be
guaranteed only when the equilibrium price is decreasing in the population (Zhelobodko et al., 2012;
Dhingra and Morrow, 2015).
13 One can compute @ ln qe=@ ln c ¼ ðh  1Þðh  fÞ=ð2h  fÞ, therefore qe increases with the marginal
cost if and only if h > f: i.e., production increases with marginal cost if demand is log-concave. On the recent
revival of the literature on incidence and pass-through, see for instance Fabinger and Weyl (2014). On
empirical evidence on incomplete pass-through see De Loecker et al. (2012).
14 Competitive effects due to strategic interactions are widely studied in industrial organisation. For trade
implications see Bertoletti and Epifani (2014) and Etro (2015). For macroeconomic implications, see Etro
and Colciago (2010).
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direct additivity). This is clearly the case of the isoelastic function but also of the
‘addilog’ function vðsÞ ¼ ða  sÞ1þc=ð1 þ cÞ with a > 0, which is the choke-off price,
and c > 0, and of the exponential function vðsÞ ¼ ebs with b > 0.15
Let us consider the example based on the addilog preferences, which delivers a
classic set of demand functions qi ¼ const  ða  pi=EÞc whose elasticity depends on
the parameter c: in particular, when c = 1 the demand is linear, when c?0 the demand
is perfectly rigid and when c?∞ it is perfectly elastic. The addilog model leads to the
following closed form solutions:
pe ¼ cc þ aE
1þ c ; n
e ¼ ðaE  cÞEL
F ðaE þ ccÞ ; q
e ¼ F ð1þ cÞ
aE  c : (7)
The second example, based on exponential preferences, generates another widely
used demand function with a log-linear specification, log qi ¼ const  bpi=E , where b
affects the semi-elasticity of demand. The associated free-entry equilibrium can be
easily derived as:16
pe ¼ c þ E
b
; ne ¼ E
2L
F ðbc þ EÞ ; q
e ¼ Fb
E
: (8)
As expected, population is neutral on prices and firm’ size. Moreover, both examples
satisfy h0 [ 0, therefore higher income makes demand more rigid, which leads firms to
increase their prices and reduce their production, with a more than proportional
increase in the number of firms. In addition, a marginal cost reduction is not fully
translated on prices, which attracts more business creation and has a limited impact on
firm size (none with log-linear demand).
At this point, one may wonder what kind of direct utility functions are associated
with indirect additivity and, in particular, with the above examples.17 We can answer
this question by solving for the inverse demand functions and then substituting them
into (1) to recover the direct utility. The Roy identity (2) provides piðxi ;E ; lÞ ¼
Ev01ðlxiÞ for each variety i. Employing the budget constraint, we obtain that l is
implicitly defined by 1 ¼ Rj v01ðlxjÞxjdj . In the addilog example, we have:
piðxi ;E ; lÞ ¼ E a  ðxi lj jÞ
1
c
h i
where l ¼  a
R n
0 xjdj  1R n
0 x
1þc
c
j dj
0
B@
1
CA
c
:
and for the log-linear demand we have:
piðxi ;E ; lÞ ¼ E
b
ln
b
lj j  ln xi
 
where l ¼ b exp  b þ
R n
0 xj ln xjdjR n
0 xjdj
 !
;
15 Other simple examples of v(s) are generalisations of the isoelastic function such as vðsÞ ¼ ðs þ g Þ1#,
with ϑ > 1, or ‘mixtures’ such as vðsÞ ¼ s1a þ s1# with ϑ 6¼ a > 1.
16 It is worth noticing that this case differs from the case of Logit demands (Anderson et al., 2012), which
derives from quasilinear preferences and exhibits no income effects.
17 Standard results ensure that, under our assumptions, preferences represented by (1) can be also
represented by a well-behaved direct utility: see Blackorby et al. (1978, section 2.2.1).
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We can derive the direct utility for the general case as follows:
U ¼
Z n
0
v v01ðlxjÞ
 
dj 
Z n
0
uð lxj
 Þdj with 1 ¼ Z n
0
v01ðlxjÞxjdj ; (9)
where the ‘subutility’ u for each good is increasing in its consumption level. As
expected, preferences are not directly separable: (9) shows that the marginal rate of
substitution between two varieties is affected by the consumption of all the others
through l. In our two examples we obtain:
U ¼ a
R n
0 xjdj  1
	 
1þc
ð1þ cÞ R n0 x1þccj dj
 c and U ¼
Z n
0
xjdj exp 
b þ R n0 xj ln xjdjR n
0 xjdj
 !
;
respectively for the addilog and log-linear case, where utility depends on total
consumption and on other aggregators of the consumption levels.18
1.2. Comparison with Other Models
To clarify the role of the assumptions on preferences in monopolistic competition, it is
important to understand that demand elasticity in a symmetric equilibrium is ultimately
determined by the elasticity of substitution.19 In particular, indirect additivity amounts
to assume that the optimal consumption ratio of any two goods does not depend on the
price of any other good. This implies that in case of a common price pi ¼ pj the elasticity
of substitution between varieties i and j does not depend on the number of goods, while
it might depend on income. Instead, under direct additivity of preferences (the D–S
model), it is the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods u0ðxiÞ=u0ðxjÞ which
is independent from the consumption of the other goods, leading to the property that
their inverse price ratio, pi=pj , is independent from the quantities of the other goods
consumed. As an implication, the elasticity of substitution between varieties i and j in the
case of a common consumption level xi ¼ xj depends only on this consumption level.
Finally, monopolistic competition under homothetic preferences (a case studied
in Benassy, 1996) implies that the elasticity of substitution cannot depend on the level of
income nor, in a symmetric equilibrium, on the price level. However, it may still depend
on the number of varieties (as in the Translog example of Feenstra, 2003).
The different implications of these three classes of preferences are a consequence of
their differences in the relevant demand elasticities and in the entry process. In case of
direct additivity (D–S, 1977),20 income affects prices in the short run but not in the
18 Another example generating closed form solutions arises if vðsÞ ¼ ðs þ g Þ1#, with ϑ > 1. Here the
equilibrium price is pe ¼ ð#c þ gEÞ=ð#  1Þ and the direct utility can be written as U ¼
½Rj xð#1Þ=#j dj #ð1 þ g Rj xjdjÞ1#. Notice that h0? 0 if g ? 0.
19 The elasticity of substitution between goods i and j is a logarithmic derivative of xi=xj with respect to
pi=pj : see Blackorby and Russell (1989) for a formal discussion of the concept and Bertoletti and Etro (2014b)
for its crucial role in models of imperfect competition and product differentiation. See Mrazova and Neary
(2013) for a article that investigates how the assumptions on demand determine the relevant comparative
statics properties of market equilibria.
20 Under direct additivity the indirect utility function depends on a price aggregator given by the marginal
utility of income k: namely, V ¼ R n0 u½u01ðkpj Þdj with k implicitly defined by E ¼ R n0 u01ðkpj Þpjdj .
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long run (Behrens and Murata, 2012a; Bertoletti and Etro, 2014a). To see this, notice
that the reciprocal of the inverse demand elasticity, eðxiÞ ¼ u0ðxiÞ=u00ðxiÞxi , depends
on the consumption level only; the free-entry equilibrium can be summarised as
follows:
pe  c
pe
¼ 1
eðqe=LÞ ; n
e ¼ EL
F eðqe=LÞ and q
e ¼ F eðq
e=LÞ  1½ 
c
; (10)
where the equilibrium price does depend on the population L, which in turn affects
non-linearly the number and the size of firms: the exact impact depends on whether ɛ
is increasing or decreasing in consumption (Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Bertoletti and
Epifani, 2014). However, the price and the production of each firm are determined
independently from income E: in spite of non-homotheticity free entry neutralises the
impact of income and markups cannot be affected by changes in consumer spending
over the business cycle if the number of firms adjusts to ensure the zero profit
condition.21
With homothetic preferences (Benassy, 1996), the demand elasticity in the case of
symmetric consumption ɛ(n) can only depend on the number of varieties offered,22
and the free-entry equilibrium can be summarised as follows:
pe  c
pe
¼ 1
eðneÞ ; n
e ¼ EL
F eðneÞ and q
e ¼ F eðn
eÞ  1½ 
c
: (11)
In this case, the number of firms increases more or less than proportionally with total
income EL depending on whether ɛ(n) is increasing or decreasing in the number of
firms, but is independent from the marginal cost, whose changes are (inversely)
proportional to the firm size. Accordingly, markup is now neutral to productivity
shocks (complete pass-through).
Summing up, under free entry, each one of the previous three classes of preferences is
characterised by a different form of ‘neutrality’ and CES preferences inherit all of them:
REMARK 1. Under endogenous entry, with indirect additivity the population is neutral on
markups but income and productivity affect them; with direct additivity income is neutral on
markups but population and productivity affect them; with homotheticity productivity is neutral
on markups but population and income affect them.
1.3. Non-separable Indirect Utilities
As the reader might expect, it is possible to extend the setting of monopolistic
competition to the general class of non-separable symmetric preferences: for a general
treatment and new examples see Bertoletti and Etro (2014b).23 The relevant indirect
21 The reason of the different free-entry results of direct and indirect additivity is rooted in the market
adjustment process, which takes place through shifts of demand due to changes in the mass of firms affecting
the marginal utility of income. Since the profit expression with direct additivity is p ¼ ½u0ðxÞ=k  cLx  F ,
there is a unique (symmetric) equilibrium (zero-profit) value of k ¼ ½nu0ðxÞx=E . On the contrary, under
indirect additivity, there is a unique equilibrium value of L=l ¼ LE= nv0ðp=EÞp½ .
22 Homotheticity implies that the indirect utility function can be written V = Ek, where the marginal utility
of income k is a homogenous of degree 1 function of all prices.
23 In the case of a finite number of goods, Bertoletti and Etro (2014b) compare equilibria under
monopolistic, Cournot and Bertrand competition.
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utility functions will in general depend on the number of the consumed varieties (as in
Feenstra, 2003). The Roy identity provides always the relevant demand of each firm i as
a function of its price pi and of some symmetric price aggregators whose values are
given for each firm (so that strategic considerations are neglected). In a symmetric
equilibrium demand elasticity can be shown to be equal to the Morishima Elasticity of
Substitution (defined in Blackorby and Russell, 1989), which depends either on the
common price-income ratio p/E or on the common consumption value x, and on the
number of varieties n (all related by the budget condition xpn = E). Accordingly, the
equilibrium markup can be affected by all the exogenous parameters E, L/F and c.
From this perspective, the three types of preferences discussed in the previous
subsection represent the polar cases in which the equilibrium elasticity depends just
either on p/E, x or n.
Here we limit our discussion to emphasise that the results obtained under indirect
additivity extend also to other interesting non-separable preferences. Consider, for
example, preferences that can be represented by the following ‘quadratic’ (non-
homothetic) indirect utility function:
V n ¼ 1
2
Z n
0
a  pj
E
 2
dj  1
2n
Z n
0
pj
E
dj
 2
: (12)
By the Roy identity we obtain the demand function:
xi ¼ aE  ðpi 
pÞ
lj jE ; (13)
where l ¼ Eð@V n=@EÞ\ 0, the additional price aggregator p ¼ R n0 pjdj=n is the
average price.24 Accordingly, a symmetric equilibrium yields the demand elasticity
e ¼ pe=aE and the equilibrium price:
pe ¼ c þ aE ; (14)
which is increasing in income but again independent from the number of consumers,
with firm size qe ¼ F =aE and number of firms ne ¼ aE2L=F ðc þ aEÞ.
2. Extensions
In this Section we extend our baseline model in a number of directions to emphasise
its tractability and to investigate new issues.
2.1. Outside Good and Optimum Product Diversity
It can be useful to introduce an outside good representing the rest of the economy, as
in many general equilibrium models.25 Let us consider a second sector producing a
homogenous good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. We follow
24 The demand presented in (13) is similar to that used to introduce monopolistic competition in the
textbook of Krugman et al. (2012, ch. 8). Income is irrelevant there since its microfoundation is inspired to
the quasilinear model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
25 A relevant part of the literature, starting with Spence (1976), has focused on quasilinear preferences,
thus eliminating income effects: see in particular Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Anderson et al. (2012).
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D–S (1977, Section II) and adopt an indirect utility that has an intersectoral Cobb–
Douglas form:26
V ¼ E
p0
 x Z n
0
v
pj
E
 
dj
 1x
; (15)
where p0 is the price of the outside good and x 2 [0,1): clearly (15) collapses to (1) for
x = 0.27 In the Appendix, we show that the pricing rule for the differentiated goods
remains the same as in (5), but the equilibrium mass of firms also depends on the
elasticity of the indirect sub-utility v, defined as gðsÞ  v0ðsÞs=vðsÞ [ 0, which reflects
the relative importance of the differentiated sector:
PROPOSITION 3. In a Cobb–Douglas two-sector economy with indirect additivity and
monopolistic competition with endogenous entry in the differentiated sector, an increase in the
number of consumers is neutral on prices and increases linearly the mass of firms but higher
income increases prices if and only if the demand elasticity is increasing in the price.
It is interesting to evaluate the welfare properties of this generalised setting. As is
well known, firms do not fully internalise the welfare impact of their entry decision,
which may lead to too many or too few firms.28 The constrained optimal allocation
(controlling prices and number of varieties under a zero profit constraint) is derived in
the Appendix and provides a simple comparison with the decentralised equilibrium for
any x 2 [0,1):
PROPOSITION 4. In a Cobb–Douglas two-sector economy with indirect additivity, monopolistic
competition with endogenous entry generates excess entry (insufficient entry) with too little (too
much) production by each firm if the elasticity of the indirect sub-utility is everywhere increasing
(decreasing) in the price.
Paralleling D–S, an intuition for this result can be obtained by noticing that g(s)
approximates the ratio between the revenue of each firm and the additional utility
generated by its variety. If g0[ ð\Þ0 they diverge and at the margin each firm finds it
more profitable to price higher (lower), i.e., to produce less (more), than what would
be socially desirable. This, in turn, attracts too many (too few) firms. One may find
more reasonable the case in which the elasticity of the sub-utility decreases when
income gets higher, which requires g0 [ 0. This is the case for the exponential and
addilog cases: accordingly, they both imply excess entry.
26 A general specification of intersectoral preferences would not change the pricing rule, but the
equilibrium number of firms would not necessarily be linear in the number of consumers.
27 We can offer two interpretation of this setting. First, it corresponds to a typical two-sector trade model in
general equilibrium. Second it can be re-interpreted in terms of a two-period model where young agents have
income E to be spent in the homogenous good or saved to consume the differentiated goods when old (with
discount factor 1/x  1 and a zero interest rate). Such a set-up can be easily introduced in an overlapping
generations (OLG) model.
28 See the original D–S (1977) paper, Kuhn and Vives (1999) and Dhingra and Morrow (2015) for key
references on this issue. Notice that the first-best allocation would require marginal cost pricing and subsidies
to the firms.
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2.2. Heterogeneous Consumers and Income Distribution
In this subsection, we generalise our model to the case of consumers with different
preferences and income. The model remains tractable and allows one to draw
implications on the impact of income distribution on the market structure (which is
not neutral as in the CES case). We assume that there is a mass L of consumers of
different ‘types’. Types are distributed across the population according to the
cumulative distribution function C(h) with support [0,1].29 The consumer of type h
has income Eh and indirect utility function given by:
Vh ¼
Z n
0
vh
pj
Eh
 
dj : (16)
As we prove in the Appendix, in the symmetric equilibrium, each firm adopts a
simple extension of the pricing rule (5) for homogenous consumers:
pe  c
pe
¼ 1
~hðpe ;CÞ with
~hðp;CÞ 
Z 1
0
hh
p
Eh
 
Eh
E
dCðhÞ; (17)
where ~h is a weighted average of the individual demand elasticities hh and the weight is
the consumer of type h’s ‘fraction’ of average income E . Under free entry, the mass L
of consumer is again neutral but the distribution of types is not.30 Moreover, we can
prove additional results on the impact of income distribution on the market structure:
PROPOSITION 5. Under indirect additivity with heterogeneous consumers and monopolistic
competition with endogenous entry, an increase in the mass of consumers is neutral on prices and
increases linearly the number of firms. With identical preferences:
(i) a change in income distribution according to the likelihood-ratio dominance raises
(decreases) prices and increases the mass of firms more (less) than proportionally to
average income if the demand elasticity is increasing (decreasing); and
(ii) a mean preserving spread decreases prices and the mass of firms if and only if the
demand elasticity is convex.
The long-run impact of a change in the income distribution is in line with the spirit
of the baseline model and breaks the neutrality emerging in models based on CES and
exponential direct utilities or other equivalent microfoundations (Behrens and
Murata, 2012b; Tarasov, 2014). However, the impact of a change in inequality is
ambiguous. To fix ideas, let us consider the case of identical preferences with a
demand elasticity increasing and convex with respect to the price, as in our addilog
example: in such a case a mean preserving spread of the income distribution increases
the average demand elasticity that is expected by the firms, which in turn reduces
prices and induces business destruction.
29 We arrange consumer types in such a way that h > k implies Eh [ Ek , exclude any form of price
discrimination (i.e., there is nomarket segmentation) and focus on the symmetric equilibrium. For an analysis
of heterogeneity in income (not in preferences) under direct additivity see Foellmi and Zweimuller (2004).
30 A special case arises if preferences are of the exponential type, i.e., vh ¼ ebhp=Eh . In such a case
hhðp=EhÞ ¼ bhp=Eh and therefore ~h ¼ p b= E , where b ¼
R
h bhdCðtÞ: the market structure depends only on b
and average income E .
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2.3. Heterogeneous Firms and Endogenous Quality
Melitz (2003) has shown that under heterogeneous productivity of the firms and CES
preferences there are no selection effects on the set of active firms when markets
expand, for instance in a boom or when the country opens up to costless trade.
However, under direct additivity this neutrality holds for changes in income but not in
the population, whose increase can give raise to ambiguous effects (depending on the
shape of the elasticity of substitution). In particular, when prices are increasing with
the size of consumption, an expansion of the market scale induces a selection effect,
forcing the exit of the least productive firms, while less productive firms are able to
survive during a contraction of the market (Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Bertoletti and
Epifani, 2014). In this subsection we show that under indirect additivity and firms
heterogeneity the market size remains neutral but income growth matters, exerting a
sort of Darwinian effect as long as h0 [ 0: income expansions allow less productive
firms to survive but downturns lead to the exit of the least productive firms.
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that, upon paying a fixed entry cost Fe , each firm
draws its marginal cost c 2 [c,∞) from a continuous cumulative distribution G(c) with
c ≥ 0. In the Appendix, we show that the equilibrium price function p(c) of an active
c-firm satisfies the pricing rule (5), that high-productivity firms produce more, get
larger revenues and are more profitable, as in Melitz (2003), but they also charge
higher markups if and only if h0 [ 0. Firms are active if their variable profits pv cover
the fixed cost F, that is if they have a marginal cost below the cut-off c^ satisfying:31
pvðc^Þ ¼ pðc^Þ  c^½ v
0½pðc^Þ=E L
l
¼ F : (18)
Moreover, the equilibrium must satisfy the endogenous entry condition:Z c^
c
pvðcÞ  F½ dGðcÞ ¼ Fe ; (19)
i.e., firms must expect zero profit from entering in the market. The two equations
determine c^ and l as a function of L, F, Fe and E but in the Appendix we show that a
change in L produces no selection effects: an increase of market size is completely
neutral on all the prices and on the productivity cut-off beyond which firms are active,
even when preferences are not CES. Instead, changes in income induce novel effects
on the structure of production:
PROPOSITION 6. Under indirect additivity, monopolistic competition with endogenous entry
and cost heterogeneity between firms, an increase in population is neutral on prices and on the
productivities of the active firms (it increases proportionally their mass) but higher income
increases prices of all firms and makes less productive firms able to survive if and only if the
demand elasticity is increasing in the price.
31 Notice that even when the fixed costs of production are null (F = 0) but there is a finite choke-off price
s (as for instance in the case of addilog preferences) the marginal cost cut-off c^ ¼ sE is increasing in income
and independent from population.
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This result rationalises a Darwinian effect of recessions: these induce the exit of low-
productivity firms, while on the contrary expansionary shocks associated with higher
spending make low-productivity firms able to survive. Notice that such a cyclical process
cannot be reproduced in the baseline Melitz model or in its extension to directly
additive preferences.32
The heterogeneous costs model can be easily extended to take into account
endogenous quality choices. This possibility has been recently explored to account for
positive correlations of productivity with both quality and prices (see for instance
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)), whereby non-homothetic
preferences are essential to explain the positive association of income with both quality
and prices associated with the Linder hypothesis (Linder, 1961). Let us suppose that
for a variety j with price pj and quality kj  0 the sub-utility is given by
vj ¼ vðpj=EÞuðkjÞ, where φ, u0 [ 0 (higher quality increases both utility and demand
without affecting demand elasticity) and limk!0 uðkÞ ¼ 0 to avoid corner solutions.
For simplicity, let us assume that a c-firm can produce goods of quality k at the marginal
cost ck, obtaining variable profits pv ¼ ðp  ckÞv0ðp=EÞuðkÞL=l. Under some regular-
ity conditions,33 the equilibrium choices p(c) and k(c) satisfy the FOCs:
p  ck
p
¼ 1
hðp=EÞ and h
p
E
 
¼ 1þ ðkÞ; (20)
where ðkÞ  u0ðkÞk=uðkÞ is the elasticity of demand with respect to quality. Price and
quality are again independent from L34 but their relation with productivity and
consumers’ income is more complex and can be derived through total differentiation
as follows:
sign
@p
@c
 
¼ sign 0f g and  sign @p
@E
 
¼ sign h0f g;
sign
@k
@c
 
¼ sign h0f g and  sign @k
@E
 
¼ sign h0f g:
First, notice that under CES preferences (h0 ¼ 0) quality is (endogenously)
independent from productivity and consumers’ income, while when demand is
isoelastic in quality (0 ¼ 0) the price is the same for all firms and more productive
firms invest more in quality. Under our standard assumption h0 [ 0, more productive
firms produce goods of higher quality. Moreover, they can even invest so much to sell
them at higher prices compared to low productivity firms: this happens when demand
becomes more sensitive to quality for products of higher quality (0 [ 0).35 Finally,
again in line with the Linder hypothesis, higher income induces specialisation in high
quality, high price goods. Notice that, given price and quality choices, variable profits
are still increasing in productivity and income and the free-entry mechanism operates
as above.
32 See Ottaviano (2012) for a related result in a model with a ‘quadratic’ direct utility and income effects.
33 The SOCs require 2h > f, n  ku00=u0\ 2ðh  1Þ and ξ(f  2h) > (h  1)(2f  3h). Accordingly, it
must be the case that h0 [ 0 if 0  0.
34 The neutrality of market size on quality is robust to more general specifications of the indirect sub-utility
as vj ¼ vðsj ; kj Þ but, once again, it breaks down with direct additivity.
35 For empirical evidence in this direction see for instance Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).
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3. A Two-country Story
One of the main limits of the trade models based on monopolistic competition with
CES preferences (Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003) is their inability in providing simple
reasons why firms change markups when selling in different countries or facing
different trade costs. It is well known that pricing to market is a pervasive
phenomenon: identical products tend to be sold at different markups in different
countries and, in particular, prices appear to be positively correlated with per capita
income (Alessandria and Kaboski, 2011) but hardly with country population (Hand-
bury and Weinstein, 2014; Simonovska, 2015). We have also evidence of incomplete
pass-through of cost reductions due to trade liberalisation (De Loecker et al., 2012). In
this Section, we generalise the basic Krugman (1980) model to indirectly additive
preferences and emphasise its implications for the structure of trade.36
We consider trade between two countries sharing the same preferences (1) and
technology, as embedded into the costs c and F, but possibly with different numbers of
consumers L and L and different productivity (i.e., labour endowment in efficiency
units). In particular, we assume that the labour endowments of consumers in the home
and foreign countries are respectively e and e, so that income levels are E = we and
E ¼ we. Accordingly, the marginal and fixed costs in the domestic and foreign
countries are respectively wc and wF and wc and wF .37 Let us assume that to export
each firm bears an ‘iceberg’ cost s ≥ 1 and, as standard, let us rule out the possibility of
parallel imports aimed at arbitraging away price differentials (i.e., international
markets are segmented). Consider the profit of a firm i, based in the home country,
which can choose two different prices for domestic sales pi and exports pzi :
pi ¼
ðpi  wcÞv0 pi
E
 
L
l
þ
ðpzi  swcÞv0 pzi
E
 
L
l
 wF ; (21)
where l and l are the home and foreign values of (3). A symmetric expression holds
for a foreign firm j, choosing prices pj and p

zj .
The optimal price rules for the home firms are:
p  wc
p
¼ 1
h
p
E
  ; pz  swc
pz
¼ 1
h
pz
E
  ; (22)
and the price rules for the Foreign firms are similarly obtained. Therefore, four different
prices emerge in the symmetric equilibrium, with l ¼ nv0ðp=EÞp=E þ nv0ðpz =EÞpz =E
36 Several recent articles have studied trade in multi-country models with non-homothetic preferences.
Behrens and Murata (2012a) and Simonovska (2015) use specific types of directly additive preferences: the
former article assumes that markets are not segmented while the latter deals with the case of international
price discrimination. Mrazova and Neary (2014), Bertoletti and Epifani (2014) and Bertoletti and Etro
(2014a) assume direct additivity: the first two articles consider identical countries (with the former focusing
on welfare with symmetric firms and the latter dealing with the case of heterogeneous firms), while the third
one investigates the case of different countries and market segmentation. Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) consider
products of different qualities within a Logit demand system.
37 Identical results would emerge assuming different productivities (affecting proportionally both
marginal and fixed cost) and equal labour endowments. This would be reflected on the equilibrium wages
and through this on incomes.
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and l ¼ nv 0ðpz=EÞpz=E þ nv0ðp=EÞp=E. The endogenous entry condition for the
firms of the home country reads as:
ðp  wcÞv0 p
E
 
L
l
þ
ðpz  swcÞv0 pz
E
 
L
l
¼ wF ; (23)
and a corresponding one holds for the firms of the foreign country. We can normalise
the home wage to unity, w = 1, and close the model with the domestic resource
constraint (or, equivalently, the labour market clearing condition):
eL ¼ n cxL þ scxzL þ Fð Þ; (24)
where x ¼ v0ðp=EÞ=l and xz ¼ v0ðpz=EÞ=l. This provides a system of seven equations
in seven unknowns (p, pz, p, pz , w
, n and n). With non-homothetic preferences,
population and productivity of a country have a distinct impact on the relative wages,
with complex implications for price differentials and the structure of trade. However,
we can get the main insights focusing on the two cases traditionally analysed in the
literature: costless trade between different countries, and costly trade between identical
countries. The former case is obtained setting s = 1 and is characterised as follows:
PROPOSITION 7. Under indirect additivity, monopolistic competition with endogenous entry
and costless trade, firms adopt a higher price in the country with higher per capita income; opening
up to trade reduces (increases) the number of firms in the country with higher (lower) per capita
income if and only if the demand elasticity is increasing, and generates pure gains from variety.
Since costless trade induces wage equalisation (wages must be the same in both
countries otherwise the zero-profit conditions could not be simultaneously satisfied;
also see Behrens and Murata, 2012a), the price rules show immediately the emergence
of pricing to market: under the standard assumption h0 [ 0, prices of identical goods
are higher in the country with the higher per capita income because demand is more
rigid compared to the other country and these prices are independent of the
population sizes.38 Consumers enjoy new varieties produced abroad and bought at the
same price of the domestic goods. Nevertheless, opening up to trade induces a
redistribution of firms and production across countries which is absent in the Krugman
(1980) model. Firms exporting to the country with poorer consumers sell there at a
lower mark up and face entry of foreign firms in the domestic market: accordingly,
they obtain lower variable profits, which leads to business destruction at home.
Therefore, the richer country is characterised by a process of concentration in fewer
and larger firms. On the contrary, business creation takes place in the poorer country,
where firms start selling abroad at higher mark ups and reduce their size. Finally, prices
and the total number of firms across countries remain the same as in autarky, therefore
the gains from trade are always pure gains from variety as in Krugman (1980).39
38 Notice that pricing to market can arise in a multi-country setting also under direct additivity (Markusen,
2013; Bertoletti and Etro, 2014a; Simonovska, 2015): a larger income implies a larger individual consumption
for each variety, which in turn affects markups. However, exactly for this reason, direct additivity also
preserves the (ambiguous) impact of the number of consumers on markups.
39 Augmenting the model with strategic interactions generates a genuine competitive effect of trade on
markups leading also to gains from competition (Etro, 2015).
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The second case we consider, the one of costly trade, is obtained by setting s > 1 with
L ¼ L and e ¼ e and is characterised as follows:
PROPOSITION 8. Under indirect additivity, monopolistic competition with endogenous entry
and costly trade between identical countries, opening up to trade reduces the markup on the
exported goods and the mass of firms in each country relative to autarky if and only if the demand
elasticity is increasing.
Because also trade costs are symmetric, wages and prices are equalised in both
countries. However, the markup applied to goods sold at home and abroad is not the
same when preferences are not homothetic. In particular, the markup (on the
marginal cost c s) is lower for the exported goods if h0 [ 0, because firms undershift
transport costs on prices (De Loecker et al. (2012) provide convincing evidence for
such incomplete pass-through of the cost reductions on prices during trade
liberalisations). This shows a different form of pricing to market, which has the
additional consequence of affecting the entry process compared to the neutrality of
the Krugman (1980) model: as long as the average markup diminishes because of
undershifting of the transport costs on export prices, opening up generates a process
of business destruction in both countries. Welfare gains from liberalisation, therefore,
cannot be guaranteed, since the changes in the price of the imported goods also affects
the gains from variety. In particular, trade liberalisation (a reduction of s) reduces the
price of imports and increases their consumption but also affects the number of firms
through changes in the average markup, which leads to an ambiguous impact on
welfare. We prove the following in the Appendix:40
REMARK 2. Trade liberalisation has a non-monotonic welfare impact when h0 [ 0, since it is
negative around autarky (assuming the existence of a finite choke-off price) and it must be positive
in the case of an opening to free trade.
Finally, under some additional conditions, we can show that richer countries trade
relatively more between themselves than poorer countries, which is also in line with the
evidence (for instance see Fieler, 2011). The export share on GDP, say
-  xzpz=ðxzpz þ xpÞ, can be derived as:
- ¼ v
0ðpz=EÞpz
v0ðpz=EÞpz þ v0ðp=EÞp (25)
where prices satisfy (22). Under CES preferences this ratio is 1=ð1 þ sh1Þ, therefore
the export share is independent from income. Under non-homotheticity, weak
additional conditions satisfied with linear and log-linear demand (f0 [ 0 is sufficient)
guarantee that the export share increases with income because the relative demand for
imported goods becomes more elastic. This is in line again with the Linder hypothesis
that richer countries trade more between themselves.
In conclusion, we note that the assumption of indirect additivity of preferences may
prove useful also to disentangle the impacts of income and population on other
40 An analogous result has been derived under direct additivity by Bykadorov et al. (2015).
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aspects of trade such as the volume of trade between countries, the emergence of
multinationals and multiproduct firms and the role of trade policy.
4. Conclusion
The contribution of this work is to propose a new tractable model of monopolistic
competition. We study the equilibria of large markets under indirect additivity of
consumers’ preferences, an alternative to the classic assumptions of direct additivity or
quasilinearity. Under reasonable conditions (namely more rigid demand for higher
income), indirect additivity generates simple predictions that are in contrast with the
traditional approach and await for empirical tests: higher income (and productivity) in
a market should increase markups and more than proportionally the number of firms,
while the number of consumers should be neutral. Our framework encompasses a
number of convenient cases such as those with addilog and exponential preferences
generating linear and log-linear demand functions. Therefore it could be applied to
analyse complex issues usually considered exclusive territory for CES modelling: in
particular, we hope that indirect additivity will prove useful in building new multi-
country trade models and dynamic macroeconomic models with monopolistic
competition and heterogeneous firms and consumers.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. By using h0p=hE ¼ h þ 1  f? 0 if and only if hþ 1? f, the result
follows from the total differentiation of (5):
@ ln pe
@ ln n
¼ 0; @ ln p
e
@ lnE
¼ hþ 1 f
2h f and
@ ln pe
@ ln c
¼ 1 hþ 1 f
2h f ; (A.1)
after noticing that 2h  f > 0 from the SOC.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the comparative statics in (A.1) and differentiating (6) we
obtain:
@ lnne
@ lnL
¼ 1; @ lnn
e
@ ln E
¼ 1þ ðhþ 1 fÞðh 1Þ
2h f and
@ lnne
@ ln c
¼ ðhþ 1 fÞðh 1Þ
2h f :
Proof of Proposition 3. By the Roy identity, the demand of each differentiated good is given by:
xi ¼ v
0ðpi=EÞZ n
0
v0ðpj=EÞ
pj
E
 x
1 x vðpj=EÞ
 
dj
;
and the profits of each firm i are given by:
pi ¼ v
0ðpi=EÞðpi  cÞLZ n
0
v0ðpj=EÞpj=E  x
1 x vðpj=EÞ
h i
dj
 F ; (A.2)
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where the denominator is unaffected by a single price. It is immediate to verify that,
independently from the value of x, each firm adopts the same pricing rule as in (5) and the
comparative static properties of the profit-maximising price pe are then the same as in
Proposition 1. The number of goods produced in the free-entry equilibrium can be derived as:
ne ¼ ELð1 xÞ g ðp
e=EÞ
F hðpe=EÞ ð1 xÞ g ðpe=EÞ þ x½  ; (A.3)
which now depends on x and both the elasticities h and g: changes in income affect prices and
the allocation of expenditure between the differentiated goods and the outside one.
Nevertheless, the number of firms is always proportional to L.
Proof of Proposition 4. We compare the market equilibrium with a constrained optimal
allocation which maximises utility under a zero-profit condition for the firms. The problem boils
down to:
max
n;p
nvðp=EÞ s.t. p ¼ c þ F
xðp;n;EÞL ;
where
xðp;n;EÞ ¼ v
0ðp=EÞ
n v0ðp=EÞ p
E
 x
1 x vðp=EÞ
h i
is the symmetric demand of a variety. Notice that the zero-profit constraint implictly defines n as
a function of p that is continuous on ½c; sE , with n(c) = 0 and limp!sE nðpÞ which is a finite
number. Accordingly, the objective function is null for p = c and p ! sE , and positive for at least
some intermediate price due to our assumptions. Therefore, an internal optimum satisfying the
FOCs must exist:
vðp=EÞ ¼  q F
Lx2
@x
@n
;
nv0ðp=EÞ=E ¼ q 1þ F
Lx2
@x
@p
 
;
where q is the relevant Lagrange multiplier. The FOCs imply:
gðp=EÞ ¼ 
xpL
F
þ @ ln xðp;n;EÞ
@ ln p
@ ln xðp;n;EÞ
@ ln n
¼ p
p  c þ
@ ln x ðp;n;EÞ
@ ln p
;
and it is easily computed that:
g0 ¼ g 1 hþ g½ 
p=E
: (A.4)
Since
@ ln xðp;n;EÞ
@ ln p
¼
x
d ln gðp=EÞ
d ln p=E
xþ ð1 xÞg 1 ¼
ð2x 1Þ g xh
xþ ð1 xÞ g ;
we obtain the optimal markup:
p  c
p
¼ xþ ð1 xÞ gð1 xÞ gð1þ gÞ þ xh : (A.5)
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Finally, the optimal mass of firms is:
n ¼ ð1 xÞ gLE
F ð1 xÞ gð1þ gÞ þ xh½  : (A.6)
Comparing (A.5) with (5), it follows that the RHS of (A.5) is larger (smaller) than 1/h
if (everywhere) h? 1 + g. Since from (A.4) it follows that g07 0 is equivalent to 1/(1 + g)? 1/h,
then (everywhere) g07 0 is equivalent to pe 7 p, which in turn implies x7 xe by the zero-profit
constraint. Using the fact that the RHS of (A.6) is larger (smaller) than the RHS of (A.3) if g0 is
smaller (larger) than zero we obtain ne 7n if g07 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. The demand of a consumer h for good i can be written as
xhiðpi ;Eh ; lhÞ ¼ v0hðpi=EhÞ=lh , where lh ¼
R
j v
0
hðpj=EhÞðpj=EhÞdj . Since types are distributed
according to C(h) with support [0,1], profits of firm i are:
pðpiÞ ¼ ðpi  cÞL
Z 1
0
xhiðpi ;Eh ; lhÞdCðhÞ  F ;
which implies that the profit-maximising price pi satisfies the FOC:
ðpi  cÞ
Z 1
0
v00h
pi
Eh
 
lhEh
dCðhÞ þ
Z 1
0
v0h
pi
Eh
 
lh
dCðhÞ ¼ 0:
Symmetric pricing implies lh ¼ nv0hðpe=EhÞðpe=EhÞ and thus:
pe  c
pe
¼

Z 1
0
Eh
npe
dCðhÞ
Z 1
0
v00h
pe
Eh
 
nv0hðpe=EhÞ
dCðhÞ
¼ 1Z 1
0
hh
pe
Eh
 
Eh
E
dCðhÞ
 1
~hðpe ;CÞ ;
where hh   v00h ðp=EhÞp=½v0hðp=EhÞEh  and E ¼
R
h EhdCðhÞ. The price rule is thus independent
from L. Endogenous entry implies the following mass of firms:
ne ¼
EL
F ~h ðpe ;CÞ ;
which proves the first part of the proposition since L affects linearly ne .
To prove the second part, suppose that all consumers share the same preferences. It is then
convenient to rewrite ~h directly as ~hðp; I Þ ¼ R E1E0 hðp=EÞðE= EÞdI ðEÞ, where I() is the income
distribution function implied by C(). To prove (1), consider a change in I according to
likelihood ratio dominance: i.e., a change from I 0 to I 1 such that i1ðEÞ=i1ðT Þ  i 0ðEÞ=i 0ðT Þ for
all E > T, E ;T 2 ½E0;E1, where iðÞ ¼ I 0ðÞ is the relevant density function. This implies that I 1
also (first-order) stochastically dominates I 0: thus, by a well-known result, this raises the average
income (i.e., E1 [ E0). We can write:
~hðpe ; I Þ ¼
Z E1
E0
h
pe
E
 
dUðE ; I Þ with UðE ; I Þ ¼
Z E
E0
T
E
dI ðT Þ;
where the cumulative distribution function Φ has density U0. Notice that:
U0ðE ; I 1Þ
U0ðT ; I 1Þ ¼
Ei1ðEÞ
Ti1ðT Þ 
Ei0ðEÞ
Ti0ðT Þ ¼
U0ðE ; I 0Þ
U0ðT ; I 0Þ for all E[T ;E ;T 2 E0;E1½ :
© 2015 Royal Economic Society.
2017] C OM P E T I T I O N WH EN I N COME M A T T E R S 1237
Accordingly, UðE ; I 1Þ dominates in terms of the likelihood ratio UðE ; I 0Þ and it must then be the
case that UðE ; I 1Þ	UðE ; I 0Þ for all E 2 E0;E1½  (i.e., the former distribution first-order
stochastically dominates the latter). It follows that when h(p/E) is a decreasing (increasing)
function of E an improvement of income distribution according to likelihood-ratio dominance
implies ~hðp; I 1Þ 	 ð Þ~hðp; I 0Þ for all p, which in turn decreases (increases) the equilibrium
value of ~h and thus raises (decreases) the equilibrium price level and the mass of active firms
more (less) than proportionally to the rise of average income.
To prove (2), suppose that I 1 is a mean-preserving spread of I 0. Then E1 ¼ E0 ¼ E . The
function hðp=EÞE= E in the definition of ~hðp; I Þ is a concave (convex) function with respect to E
if and only if h00\ð[ Þ0. By a standard result, it must then be the case that ~hðp; I 0Þ[ ð\Þ~hðp; I 1Þ
when h00\ð[ Þ0. It follows that a mean-preserving spread decreases (increases) the equilibrium
value of ~h, and then raises (decreases) prices and the mass of firms when h is a concave (convex)
function of the price.
Proof of Proposition 6. The variable profits of an active c-firm are given by
pv ¼ ðp  cÞv0ðp=EÞL=l, where l is independent of its price choice. Therefore, the pricing
rule (5) applies to all firms. We denote with p = p(c) the profit-maximising price of a c-firm, with
xðcÞ ¼ v0½pðcÞ=E =l the individual consumption of its product, and with:
pvðcÞ ¼ pðcÞ  c½ v0½pðcÞ=E L=l
its variable profit for given l defined as:
l ¼ n
Z c^
c
v0½pðcÞ=E ½pðcÞ=E dGðcÞ
Gðc^Þ \0:
Note that the optimal price of firm c does not depend upon L and l and follows the same
comparative statics as in Proposition 1, with @ lnp(c)/@ lnc 71 and @ lnp(c)/@ lnE 7 0 if and
only if h0? 0. Moreover, the FOCs and SOCs for profit maximisation imply the following
elasticities with respect to the marginal cost:
@ ln xðcÞ
@ ln c
¼ h½pðcÞ=E  @ ln pðcÞ
@ ln c
\0; (A.7)
@ ln pðcÞxðcÞ
@ ln c
¼ fh½pðcÞ=E   1g
2
2h½pðcÞ=E   f½pðcÞ=E \0; (A.8)
@ lnpvðcÞ
@ ln c
¼ 1 h½pðcÞ=E \0: (A.9)
Accordingly, high-productivity (low-c) firms are larger, make more revenues, are more profitable
and they charge higher (lower) markups if h is increasing (decreasing). In addition, for the given
l, we have the following elasticities with respect to income:
@ ln xðcÞ
@ ln E
¼ h½pðcÞ=E 
2  h½pðcÞ=E 
2h½pðcÞ=E   f½pðcÞ=E  [ 0; (A.10)
@ ln pðcÞxðcÞ
@ lnE
¼ h½pðcÞ=E 
2 þ 1 f½pðcÞ=E 
2h½pðcÞ=E   f½pðcÞ=E  [ 1; (A.11)
@ lnpvðcÞ
@ ln E
¼ h½pðcÞ=E [ 1: (A.12)
The size of each firm increases with E (for given l), and revenues and profits increase more than
proportionally. However, each price increases with respect to income only when h0 [ 0 and
decreases otherwise. The set of active firms is the set of firms productive enough to obtain
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positive profits. Denote by c^ the marginal cost cutoff, namely the value of c satisfying the zero
cutoff profit condition pvðc^Þ ¼ F , or:
pðc^Þ  c^½ v0½pðc^Þ=E L ¼ lF : (A.13)
The relation (A.13) implicitly defines c^ ¼ c^ðE ; lj jF =LÞ. Differentiating it yields:
@ ln c^
@ lnE
¼ h½pðc^Þ=E 
h½pðc^Þ=E   1 [ 0; (A.14)
@ ln c^
@ ln lj j ¼
@ ln c^
@ ln F
¼  @ ln c^
@ lnL
¼ 1
1 h½pðc^Þ=E \0: (A.15)
Endogenous entry of firms in the market implies that expected profits:
Efpg ¼
Z c^
c
pvðcÞ  F½ dGðcÞ; (A.16)
must be equal to the sunk entry cost Fe . The expected profits decrease when the absolute value of
l increases, that is @E{p}/@|l| < 0. Accordingly, the condition Efpg ¼ Fe pins down uniquely
the equilibrium value of l as a function lðE ;L; F ; FeÞ. Moreover, using (A.13) the free entry
condition can be written as:Z c^
c
pðcÞ  c½  v0 ½pðcÞ=E 
pðc^Þ  c^½  v0 ½pðc^Þ=E   1
 
dGðcÞ ¼ Fe
F
: (A.17)
The system {(A.13), (A.17)} can actually be seen as determining c^ and l in function of L, F, Fe
and E. The second equation, (A.17), fixes c^ and is independent from L, while the first one,
(A.13), determines l as linear with respect to L. The cut-off c^ is therefore independent of market
scale, because l proportionally adjusts in such a way to keep constant the ratio L/l and thus the
variable profit of the cut-off firm. As a consequence, as in Melitz (2003), a change in L produces
no selection effect, even when preferences are not CES. However, (A.17) shows that changes in
the fixed costs are not neutral on the set of active firms: an increase in the fixed cost of
production F or a reduction in the fixed cost of entry Fe require a reduction in the equilibrium
value of the cut-off c^, which correspond to the typical selection effect a la Melitz (2003). The
impact of income E is instead more complex. Since by (A.12) and (A.14) an increase of E raises
E{p}, it must increase the equilibrium value of |l| to satisfy zero expected profits. In particular,
we have:
@ ln lj j
@ lnE
¼ 
@E p½ 
@E
@E p½ 
@ lj j
E
lj j ¼
hðc^Þ[ 0; where (A.18)
hðc^Þ ¼
Z c^
c
1
h½pðcÞ=E 
pðcÞxðcÞR c^
c pðcÞxðcÞdGðcÞ
dGðcÞ
8<
:
9=
;
1
is the harmonic mean of the h values according to G() and c^. Computing the total derivative of c^
with respect to E using (A.14), (A.15) and (A.18), we obtain:
d ln c^
d ln E
¼ @ c^
@E
þ @ c^
@ lj j
@ lj j
@E
 
E
c^
¼ h½pðc^Þ=E  
hðc^Þ
h½pðc^Þ=E   1 ; (A.19)
which is positive if and only if (everywhere) h0 [ 0: that is, in addition to increasing (decreasing)
the mark up of the inframarginal firms, a rise of E creates an anti-selection (selection) effect if h
increases (decreases)with respect to theprice. To close themodel, the expectedmass of activefirms
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n is determined by the budget constraint, requiring average expenditure to equal E/n, and thus:
n ¼ EZ c^
c
pðcÞxðcÞdGðcÞ
Gðc^Þ
: (A.20)
Since an increase of the mass of consumers L affects proportionally l and, thus, proportionally
reduces individual consumption x(c), it follows from (A.20) that it also proportionally increases
the mass of varieties.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let us assume s = 1. In such a case each firm faces the same demand
functions, independently from the country in which it is based. However, the firms based in the
home country have a cost advantage (disadvantage) with respect to firms from the foreign
country if w < (>) w. Since a necessary condition for a monopolistic equilibrium with
endogenous entry in both countries is p ¼ p ¼ 0, it follows that it must be w=w ¼ 1.
Accordingly, we can normalise the common wage to w ¼ w ¼ 1 (which restores the notation of
the baseline model with E = e and E ¼ e), and conclude that in a symmetric equilibrium
p ¼ pz and p ¼ pz . This means that all firms adopt the same price in the same country, with:
p  c
p
¼ 1
h
p
E
  ; p  c
p
¼ 1
h
p
E
  ; (A.21)
where p [ p when E [ E if and only if h0 [ 0 (everywhere). The opening of costless trade has
no impact on prices and mark ups relative to autarky, extending this property of the Krugman
(1980) model to our entire class of indirectly additive preferences. From the symmetry, we infer
that all firms have the same profit and using the price rules in (A.21) the zero-profit constraint
provides the total mass of firms as follows:
n þ n ¼ EL
F h
p
E
 þ EL
F h
p
E
  : (A.22)
This is the sum of the masses of firms emerging under the autarky equilibrium in each separate
country, say na ¼ EL=F hðp=EÞ and na ¼ EL=F hðp=EÞ, therefore the total mass of firms
remains the same. This implies that after opening up to trade welfare unambiguously increases
because of the increase in the number of consumed varieties. However, the mass of firms active in
each country is not the same as in autarky. In fact, by using the resource constraints one can obtain:
n
n
¼ EL
EL
Q n
a
na
¼ ELhðp
=EÞ
ELhðp=EÞ if E[E
 and h0R 0; (A.23)
where we used the fact that p=E Q p=E if E [ E and h0R 0. Since the total number of firms is
constant, the number of firms in the rich (poor) country must decrease (increase) if h0[ ð\Þ0.
Finally, the resource constraint of each contry implies that whenever the domestic mass of firms
increases (decreases) their size must decrease (increase).
Proof of Proposition 8. Let us assume s > 1 but L ¼ L and e ¼ e. In such a case, all the
equilibrium variables must be the same across countries by symmetry. Therefore, we can again
normalise w ¼ w ¼ 1, which implies that E ¼ E. The internal prices and the prices of exports
must be the same in both countries, i.e., p ¼ p and pz ¼ pz . These prices satisfy:
p  c
p
¼ 1
h
p
E
  ; pz  sc
pz
¼ 1
h
pz
E
  :
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By Proposition 1 we know that pz [ p and ðp  cÞ=pR ðpz  scÞ=pz if and only if h0T 0. By
symmetry the number of firms in each country is the same, say n, but this does not need to
be the same as in autarky, na ¼ EL=F hðp=EÞ. To find the number of firms in each country
after opening up to trade, let us combine the free entry condition (23) with the price rules
(22) to obtain:
pxL
h
p
E
 þ pzxzL
h
pz
E
  ¼ F :
By using E ¼ nðpx þ pzxzÞ the number of firms can be derived as follows:
n ¼EL
F h
with h  -h pz
E
 1
þð1 -Þh p
E
 1 1
: (A.24)
Notice that h is the harmonic average of h(s) and hðszÞ, where s = p/E and sz ¼ pz=E , with
weights corresponding to the share values of total sales (ϖ is given in (25)). Under CES
preferences this is a constant: the number of firms is the same as in autarky (independent from
the transport costs). Otherwise, since sz [ s, we have nQna if and only if h 0T 0.
Proof of Remark 2. Let us consider welfare in the model with costly trade between two
symmetric countries. Since we can write:
V ¼ n vðsÞ þ vðszÞ½ ;
the impact of trade liberalisation (a reduction of trade iceberg cost s) can be accounted by:
d lnV ¼ d lnn þ d ln½vðsÞ þ vðszÞ:
Notice that the second term on the right-hand side of last expression always has a sign opposite
to that of the associated change in trade costs (for s\s), since:
d ln½vðsÞ þ vðszÞ ¼ v
0ðszÞszd ln sz
vðsÞ þ vðszÞ
and d ln sz [ 0 if and only if s increases. Also notice that (A.24) implies:
d lnn ¼ h d- -d ln hðszÞ
hðszÞ 
d-
hðsÞ
 
;
where ϖ is the GDP export share. With CES preferences d ln n = 0, and trade liberalisation is
always welfare enhancing. Beyond this case, we can sign the welfare impact of trade liberalisation
starting from autarky when there exists a finite choke-off price, and around free trade. First, let
us consider autarky, where -a ¼ 0 and saz ¼ s so that d ln½vðsaÞ þ vðsÞ ¼ 0. Trade liberalisa-
tion implies:
d lnV a ¼ d lnna ¼ hðs
aÞ
hðsÞ  1
 
d-a ;
since the welfare contribution of imported goods is negligible. As d-a [ 0, it follows that
d lnV a 7 0 whenever h0? 0 everywhere. Therefore, trade liberalisation from autarky reduces
welfare if and only if h0 [ 0, due to a reduction in the number of goods associated with a
reduction in the average markup; an analogous result has been derived under direct additivity
(and an elasticity of substitution decreasing with respect to the size of consumption) by
Bykadorov et al. (2015). Notice that, since moving from autarky to free trade is equivalent to
doubling of the market size, which implies a welfare improvement from Proposition 7, the effects
of trade liberalisation on welfare are necessarily non-monotonic when h0 [ 0 everywhere. In fact,
we can evaluate the impact of an increase in trade costs starting from free trade (denoted by ‘ft’),
where - ft ¼ 1=2, s ft ¼ s ftz ¼ sa and d ln sftz [ 0, so that:
© 2015 Royal Economic Society.
2017] C OM P E T I T I O N WH EN I N COME M A T T E R S 1241
d lnV ft ¼  h
0ðsaÞsa
2hðsaÞ þ
v0ðsaÞsa
2vðsaÞ
 
d ln s ftz ;
which is certainly negative if h0ðsaÞ  0: in such a case trade liberalisation is welfare enhancing in
the neighbourhood of free trade because it increases the number of consumed goods due to a
business creation effect caused by the larger average markup, and reduces prices as well.41
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